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FOUNDATIONS OF SKEPTICAL THEISM:  
CORNEA, CORE, AND CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES
Stephen J. Wykstra and Timothy Perrine
Some skeptical theists use Wykstra’s CORNEA constraint to undercut Rowe-
style inductive arguments from evil. Many critics of skeptical theism accept 
CORNEA, but argue that Rowe-style arguments meet its constraint. But  
Justin McBrayer argues that CORNEA is itself mistaken. It is, he claims, akin 
to “sensitivity” or “truth-tracking” constraints like those of Robert Nozick; 
but counterexamples show that inductive evidence is often insensitive. We 
here defend CORNEA against McBrayer’s chief counterexample. We first 
clarify CORNEA, distinguishing it from a deeper underlying principle that 
we dub “CORE.” We then give both principles a probabilistic construal, and 
show how, on this construal, the counterexample fails.
The new “inductive atheism” argues that certain empirical features of evil 
are strong inductive (or “probabilistic”) evidence against theism. A fea-
ture stressed by William Rowe, for example, is the “noseeum” character 
of much suffering. We can, try as we may, see no God-justifying1 good 
served by much suffering. And our seeing no God-justifying good served 
by an instance of suffering is, it is argued, strong evidence for there being 
no God-justifying good served by it—and hence also, by a further short 
step, for there being no God. Against this reasoning, so-called “skeptical 
theists” press this question:
Granted, atheism makes the feature you cite—here, the noseem feature—
entirely expectable. But isn’t this feature also pretty expectable if it were the 
case that God exists? If God were to exist, shouldn’t we expect—God being 
God and us being us—to often not see the goods He purposes for many 
evils? And if that’s so, how can this feature be regarded as strong evidence 
that God doesn’t exist?
The skeptical theist here employs a “neutralizing tactic”—a tactic for 
defusing alleged strong evidence—that we can find used in many con-
texts.2 While this neutralizing strategy is intuitively appealing, it is not 
1By a “God-justifying good” served by for an evil, we mean a good that would suffice to 
justify an all-powerful, all-knowing, and entirely good Creator in allowing that evil. The 
question of whether we see any such good in a given case is independent of whether God 
exists and of whether that good is the actual reason justifying God in allowing the evil.
2The New Testament scholar F. F. Bruce thus opens Jesus and Christian Origins Outside the 
New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982) by citing a correspondent vexed by whether, 
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easy to adequately formulate the implicit principle on which it rests. One 
formulation has been Wykstra’s CORNEA—the Condition of ReasoNable 
Epistemic Access.3 Although CORNEA has morphed through many ver-
sions, all versions offer an acid test for whether one can reasonably regard 
some piece of evidence E as being strong4 evidence for some hypothesis 
H. The test is this: ask whether, if H were false, E would likely be different. 
If the reasonable answer—what one is warranted in asserting—is “No,” 
then one isn’t entitled to regard E as strong evidence for H.5
Some critics, including Rowe himself, have tended to accept the COR-
NEA test, arguing only that the favored evidential feature passes the test. 
But others have called the test itself into question, including most recently 
Justin McBrayer.6 McBrayer notes that CORNEA resembles “truth-tracking” 
or “sensitivity” theories of knowledge like that of Robert Nozick. Such theo-
ries place “sensitivity” requirements on knowledge—requirements usually 
stated using subjunctive conditionals. To say that my belief that the chimes 
on my patio are now ringing is “sensitive” means that if they weren’t now 
ringing, I would not now be forming the belief that they are. Nozick’s idea 
that a belief that p is knowledge only if it is sensitive to p is attractive, but it 
is now widely seen as falling to counterexamples—counterexamples arising, 
especially, for inductive knowledge.7 And CORNEA, McBrayer thinks, falls to 
in contemporary documents outside the New Testament, one finds any “collateral proof of 
the historical fact of the life of Jesus Christ.” Bruce counters by asking: in “which contempo-
rary writers during the first fifty years after the death of Christ, would you expect to find the 
collateral evidence you are looking for?” (17). Bruce then argues that we should not, in the na-
ture of the case, expect to find the sort of collateral evidence the correspondent finds lacking.
3For earlier discussions of CORNEA, see Stephen Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to 
Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance,’” International 
Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984), 73–93; “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from 
Evil,” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder, (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University press, 1996), 126–150; and “CORNEA, Carnap, and Current Closure Be-
fuddlement,” Faith and Philosophy 24 (January 2007), 87–98.
4Below, we follow Wykstra in defining “strong evidence” more precisely as “levering 
evidence.”
5CORNEA offers only a necessary condition for being entitled to regard E as strong 
evidence for H. If the reasonable answer is “Yes,” then one may or may not be entitled to 
regard E as strong evidence for H.
6Justin McBrayer, “CORNEA and Inductive Evidence,” Faith and Philosophy 26 (January 
2009), 77–83. All McBrayer citations refer to this paper.
7The most well-known sensitivity theory of knowledge is that developed by Robert 
Nozick in Philosophical Explanations (Harvard: Belknap Press, 1981), 167ff. The kinship be-
tween CORNEA and Nozickean sensitivity is presupposed by Richard Swinburne’s critique 
in “Does Theism Need a Theodicy?,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (June 1988), rebutted 
by Wykstra’s 2004 APA paper “Skeptical Gambits and the Two Roads to Atheism: Swin-
burne vs. CORNEA.” As Chad McIntosh has called to our attention, CORNEA also has close 
kin in a criterion (for “taking”) given by Roderick Chisholm in his “‘Appear,’ ‘Take,’ and 
‘Evident,’” reprinted in Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, ed. Robert J. Schwarz (U. Cal. Press, 
1965), p. 484. For an account of why inductive knowledge poses problems for Nozick’s ac-
count, see Jonathan Vogel’s “Tracking, Closure, and Inductive Knowledge,” in The Possibility 
of Knowledge: Nozick and his Critics, ed. Steven Luper-Foy (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1989), esp. pp. 204–213. For signs of an opposing groundswell, see Keith DeRose, 
“Insensitivity is Back, Baby!,” Philosophical Perspectives 24, Epistemology (2010), 161–187.
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similar counterexamples. It is, he writes, “a sensitivity constraint on evidence, 
and inductive evidence is often insensitive.”8
McBrayer’s counterexamples provide a challenging occasion to probe 
the foundations of skeptical theism. We here focus on two foundational 
aspects that, in light of McBrayer’s treatment, need illumination. First, 
McBrayer—appropriating a recent suggestion of Wykstra—directs his cri-
tique against a reformulation of CORNEA that changes CORNEA into 
a criterion of when something “counts as [strong] evidence.” To develop 
Wykstra’s suggestion more faithfully, we distinguish two principles—the 
strongly internalist CORNEA, and a strongly externalist principle behind 
CORNEA that we call CORE:
(CORE) In cognitive situation S giving new input E, E is levering evi-
dence for hypothesis H only if it is true that if H were false, E 
would likely be different.
CORNEA expresses an internalist constraint on when one is entitled to re-
gard E as strong evidence for H, whereas CORE expresses an externalist 
constraint on when E actually is strong evidence for H. Still, CORE and 
CORNEA share a common interest, for on each, the crux of the matter, so 
to speak, concerns the truth or warranted assertibility (respectively) of a 
crucial conditional that we dub “crux”:
(crux)  If H were false, E would likely be different.
The second foundational aspect we aim to illuminate is how best to con-
strue crux. Now crux is a conditional “were-would” sentence—what we 
call a grammatical subjunctive. Perhaps due to this grammatical feature, 
McBrayer sees it as a logical subjunctive or counterfactual, and so treats 
it using standard “closest possible worlds” semantics.9 We propose tak-
ing it as a “non-counterfactual subjunctive”10 best treated as a condition-
al probability, for which the tool of choice is the probability calculus.11 
This probabilistic treatment enables both CORE and CORNEA to handle 
McBrayer’s chief counterexample; it also, we hope, improves the founda-
tions of skeptical theism, bringing it into relation with issues of broader 
epistemological interest.
8McBrayer, 77. Italics ours.
9On such a standard semantics, a broadly counterfactual conditional is true just in case 
the consequent is true in the closest antecedent world(s)—the closest world(s) where the 
antecedent is true. See Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), and Stalnaker, “A 
Theory of Conditionals,” in Conditionals, ed. Frank Jackson (Oxford: Oxford, 1991), 28–45. 
The differences between Lewis and Stalnaker will not affect our treatment here.
10Robert Stalnaker, “Indicative Conditionals,” in Jackson, Conditionals, 136–154, espe-
cially 146. See also Alan Ross Anderson, “A Note on Subjunctive and Counterfactual Con-
ditionals,” Analysis 12 (Dec. 1951), 35–38.
11Cf. Wykstra’s “CORNEA, Carnap, and Current Closure Befuddlement,” 89 fn12: “I 
originally meant the subjunctive formulation [in CORNEA] to express probabilistic impli-
cations of theories with Bayes’ theorem in mind; the appropriateness of Lewis-Stalnaker 
semantics here needs scrutiny.”
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1. The CORE Behind CORNEA
To develop the suggestion that behind the internalist CORNEA is a deeper 
externalist CORE, we do four things here. First, we locate two versions of 
CORNEA within the dialectic of Rowe’s own development of his argument. 
Second, we explain the type of strong evidence—namely, “levering evi-
dence”—that CORNEA is a constraint on. Third, we distinguish CORNEA 
from CORE, contrasting our version of CORE with a flawed version—which 
we dub “McCORNEA”—offered by McBrayer. And fourth, we introduce 
the probabilistic approach to crux, the crucial conditional in both CORE 
and CORNEA.
1.1 Rowe’s Appears-Idiom and Two Versions of CORNEA
CORNEA proposes a necessary condition on the type of confirming evi-
dence that Rowe-style arguments purport to offer. Rowe’s earliest argu-
ments couch this evidence using the appears-idiom.12 A central strand of 
his argument can be represented as follows. Consider a case of a fawn 
horribly burned in a distant forest fire, lying in suffering for days before 
dying. Our cognitive situation is that:
(Rowe-1) We can, try as we may, see no God-justifying good served by 
the fawn’s suffering.
This feature of our cognitive situation, Rowe thinks, entitles us to claim:
(Rowe-2) It appears that there is no such God-justifying good served by 
the fawn’s suffering.
And this appears-claim, he thinks, warrants the conclusion that:
(Rowe-3) Probably, there is no God-justifying good served by this suf-
fering.
We construe Rowe-3 as claiming that the noseeum feature of suffering is 
prima facie evidence against theism.13 And the step from Rowe-2 to Rowe-3 
is best construed as drawing upon the norms governing how things epis-
temically “appear” to one.14 It is licensed by an epistemic principle of justi-
fication that Swinburne calls the principle of credulity: when something 
epistemically appears to be a certain way, then it reasonable for one—barring 
12William Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Phil-
osophical Quarterly 16 (1979), 335–341. Our representation here is meant to bring out the 
salient features relevant to a CORNEA defense, not to exegete the finer points of Rowe’s 
argumentation.
13 In “Problem of Evil” Rowe, instead of using the term “probably,” tends to put this as 
“it appears reasonable to believe that.” As explained in the next section, we take Rowe-3 
to be leaving open the possibility that other parts of one’s total evidence might defeat the 
strong prima facie evidence provided by the facts of evil. Rowe-3 thus has an implicit “bar-
ring defeaters” clause making it still a claim about the prima facie or in-itself weight of the 
adduced data.
14Cf. Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle,” 85ff.
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defeaters—to believe that it is that way. Thus, if one lacks any defeaters, the 
noseeum feature of suffering can, by itself, be sufficient to reasonably war-
rant a shift from agnosticism to atheism.
The nerve of Wykstra’s critique was to argue that Rowe’s argument fails 
in its very first step—in the move from Rowe-1 to Rowe-2. While the move 
from “we see no such-and-such” to “it appears that there is no such-and-
such” may seem innocuous, it is legitimate in some cases but illegitimate 
in others. For example, suppose your doctor drops a hypodermic needle 
on the floor, picks it up, looks at it carefully, and proceeds to try to use it 
on your arm. When you protest that it may be contaminated, he reasons 
as follows:
(Needle-1) We can, try as we may, see no viruses on the needle.
(Needle-2) Hence, it appears that there are no viruses on the needle.
(Needle-3) So probably (barring defeaters), there are no viruses on the 
needle.
You will certainly think your doctor has gone wrong in getting to Needle-3. 
But should you think that he has, in this situation, gone wrong in the very 
move from Needle-1 to Needle-2? Friends of CORNEA think you should.15 
For if there were viruses on the needle, then given the nature of viruses and 
of human vision, failing to see them is precisely and obviously what you 
(and the doctor) should expect. For this reason, not seeing such viruses in 
no way entitles the doctor to claim that there appear to be no viruses on the 
needle. CORNEA simply generalizes this intuitive constraint:
(CORNEA-1) On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled 
to claim “it appears that p” only if it is reasonable for H 
to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use 
she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would 
likely be different than it is in some way discernible 
to her.16
To apply CORNEA to Rowe’s argument, we must ask whether there are, 
on balance, good reasons to think that if God were to exist, then God-
justifying goods connected to observed cases of suffering would, by virtue 
of God’s nature and our human limitations, often not be evident to us. If 
there are such reasons, and Rowe is made cognizant of them, then it is not 
(or cannot remain) reasonable for him to believe crux. And if this is so, 
then, by CORNEA, Rowe is not entitled to his claim that there appears to 
15McBrayer links his reformulation of CORNEA (discussed below) to the contention that 
one should meet evidential arguments in the appears-idiom by resisting the move from the 
second claim (e.g., Rowe-2) to the third claim (e.g., Rowe-3), while not resisting the move 
from first claim (e.g., Rowe-1) to the second (Rowe-2). But this implies that in the needle 
case, one will not resist the doctor’s claim that there appear to be no viruses on the needle. 
We take this as a reductio ad absurdum of McBrayer’s contention.
16Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle,” 85.
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be no God-justifying good served by the observed cases of suffering. Such 
a claim is as ill-founded as our doctor’s claim that there appear to be no 
viruses on the needle.
CORNEA was initially formulated using the “appears” idiom because 
this was prominent in Rowe’s own formulation of his argument. But Rowe 
later reformulates his argument without using the appears-idiom. CORNEA 
is easily reformulated to follow suit, and thereby assumes a more general 
and powerful form.17 It can thus be reformulated as:
(CORNEA-2) For person P in a certain cognitive situation S, P is en-
titled to claim that new evidence E is levering evidence 
for H only if it is reasonable for P to believe that (crux) if H 
were false, E would, in the situation S, likely be different.
CORNEA-2 places the same condition on claims regarding levering evi-
dence as CORNEA-1 places on epistemic appears-claims. While the two 
sorts of claims have identical import, it is preferable to work with this 
more general levering-evidence version of CORNEA. In what follows, the 
term ‘CORNEA’ shall thus refer to CORNEA-2.
1.2 What CORNEA Constrains: Levering Evidence and the By / On Distinction
CORNEA proposes a constraint on “Rowean” evidence—the type of con-
firming evidence that Rowe-style arguments purport to provide against 
theism. We call such evidence “levering evidence.” As we use this term, 
evidence E qualifies as levering evidence for a hypothesis H only if E has 
the following three features.
First, to be levering evidence, E must consist of some alleged fact(s) or 
input such that acquiring or getting this input properly changes18 the prob-
ability or credibility of hypothesis H from what it was prior to, or apart 
from, getting E.19 Levering evidence is thus—to adopt the terminology of 
an earlier paper20—“dynamic.” That is, it is by the addition of evidence 
that the probability of a hypothesis is levered, or shifted, to a new value. 
Levering evidence, and dynamic evidence more generally, must be care-
fully distinguished from “static” evidence. E is static confirming evidence 
for H only if the probability of H, on E, is above some relevant threshold 
17For a review of the dialectic, see Rowe “Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the 
Problem of Evil,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59 (2006), 79–92; Wykstra, 
“Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil.” Wykstra discusses the special and general for-
mulations in Wykstra, “Suffering, Evidence, and Analogy: Noseeum Arguments Versus 
Skeptical Gambits,” in Philosophy through Science Fiction, ed. Ryan Nicholas et al. (New York: 
Routledge, 2008).
18Here the normative “proper” carries the idea that although E may not actually change 
the person’s belief regarding H (due to some cognitive defect, say), E is (epistemically) able 
to do so: it has what it takes to do so.
19Here the “prior to or apart from” allows that the “new” alleged facts may be either 
newly acquired facts or more familiar facts whose relation to the hypothesis is being newly 
considered or re-considered. (Here and elsewhere comments by Paul Draper were helpful.)
20“CORNEA, Carnap, and Current Closure Befuddlement,” 91.
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(e.g., .5). A hypothesis may be made more probable by some fact, even if the 
hypothesis has (statically) a low probability on that fact.21
For example—to adapt an example from Elliott Sober22—suppose that I 
am playing poker and want to know if the card I am about to be dealt will 
be the Jack of Hearts. The dealer is careless, and I see that the next card is 
red. The fact that the card is red “confirms” in a dynamic sense that the 
card is the Jack of Hearts, potentially doubling its probability—from 1 in 
52 (about .02) to 1 in 26 (about .04). Nevertheless, the hypothesis that the 
next card is the Jack of Hearts is still very improbable on the fact that the 
next card is red. So in a static sense, the fact that the card is red does not 
“confirm” the hypothesis that the next card is the Jack of Hearts, since the 
probability is below the relevant threshold of (say) .5.
The second feature of levering evidence E is that E must properly 
change the probability or credibility of the hypothesis sharply. To give this 
content, we follow Wykstra’s earlier article23 in distinguishing between 
three “square” doxastic states—namely, square belief, square disbelief, 
and square non-belief (that is, squarely suspended or withheld belief). We also 
adopt his simplifying assumption24 that “square belief” can be associated 
with giving a proposition a probability (or degree of credibility) fairly close 
to 1 (say, .99 or higher), “square disbelief” with giving the proposition a 
probability close to 0 (say, .01 or below), and “square non-belief” with giv-
ing the proposition a probability of around .5.25 We then call a doxastic 
change a “sharp” change if it is from one square doxastic state to anoth-
er—in particular, from square non-belief to square belief.26 By “levering 
evidence” we thus mean evidence for or against a hypothesis that is of 
21On the By / On distinction see ibid. There is a further distinction to be made here be-
tween the “isolated” static probability of H on E alone, and its “holistic” static probability 
on E plus one’s other background information. We here have in mind the holistic sense.
22Sober gives a similar example in did darwin Write the Origin Backwards: Philosophical 
Essays on darwin’s Theory (New York: Prometheus Books, 2011), 145–146. Sober uses his 
example to target “the special consequence condition of confirmation” as formulated by 
Hempel in his classic 1945 paper “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” mind 54, 1–26 
and 97–121. It should be noted, however, that under Carnap’s tutoring, Hempel revised his 
early ambiguous formulation, and that the improved principle—now restricted to static 
confirmation—is correct. See Hempel’s Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: MacMil-
lan, 1965), especially “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” fn40 and “Postscript (1964) On 
Confirmation,” 49–50.
23Wykstra, “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil,” 130–132.
24This is, we stress, a simplifying assumption in which the vague term “associate” is 
used advisedly. Given the vagaries of the concept of belief, it may be preferable to speak of 
squarely “accepting” a proposition, for identifying belief with being above any probabilistic 
threshold leads quickly into familiar lottery paradoxes. We think our results will be sus-
tainable however these tricky issues are eventually negotiated. (Comments by Glenn Ross 
were helpful to us here.)
25We emphasize here that the values we are assigning are elucidatory; that square be-
liefs, along with square non-beliefs, represent more of a range of values.
26Levering in this way is by no means an unrealistically high bar for evidence to meet. 
The simplest testimonial evidence is, for example, able to exceed this bar without difficulty. 
A colleague informing me that he has three children properly levers me to believing that he 
has three children, even though I was in a state of square agnosticism prior to that.
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sufficient strength to shift the rational credibility of a hypothesis from one 
square state to another. We formulate crux as a condition on levering evi-
dence for a hypothesis. It is also a condition on levering evidence against a 
hypothesis, since to claim E is levering evidence against a hypothesis is to 
claim that E is levering evidence for the denial of that hypothesis.27
Third, we intend this notion of levering evidence—in keeping with 
Rowe-style arguments—to capture what might be called the prima facie 
(rather than “ultima facie”) bearing of E on H.28 Here we may think of our-
selves as like Blind Lady Justice. Eventually, she wants to be in a position to 
weigh all the evidence for and against a particular hypothesis in the two 
pans of her scales. But initially, she wants to determine how weighty some 
individual pieces of evidence are. She thus starts from some squarely neu-
tral or “even” position, and asks how much some item of interest can tilt 
her balance from that even position. An answer to this question—the one, 
we think, Rowe means to be addressing—leaves open the further question 
of how the scales will tilt when any opposing evidence is placed on the 
other pan.
1.3 The Real Core of CORNEA: CORE vs. mcCORNEA
CORNEA posits a constraint on when someone is entitled to claim, in some 
cognized situation, that certain data or input is levering evidence for 
some hypothesis.29 This constraint is “internalist,” for it requires that it 
be, for this person, reasonable to believe that the following test condition 
is satisfied: if H were false, then E would likely be different. CORNEA’s 
constraint is thus doubly internalist: it is a constraint on when a person 
is entitled to make a levering-evidence claim, and the constraint itself is 
that it be reasonable for that person to believe30 a particular conditional claim 
(namely, crux).
As McBrayer notes, Wykstra has recently suggested that “behind 
CORNEA” is a deeper idea:
the key idea behind CORNEA is a proposed test for whether some alleged 
evidence seriously ‘supports’—in a sense to be clarified presently—some 
hypothesis H. [The test is this: ask whether, if H were false, E would likely 
be different. If the answer is “No,” then E can’t seriously support H.]31
27We thank an anonymous referee for urging more clarity on this point.
28Thus Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle,” “[Rowe’s] overall claim . . . is that the evi-
dence of suffering supports atheism in what we might call a ‘qualifiedly strong’ sense, viz., 
it strongly supports atheism provided that independent assessments of theistic arguments 
show these to be as weak as Rowe, based on his independent study of them, gives us his 
word they are” (79).
29Or “entitled to regard” it as levering evidence.
30In the sense used here, it can be reasonable for a person to believe a proposition even if 
he or she does not believe this in any conscious way; see Wykstra’s dispositional explication 
in “Humean Obstacle,” 87.
31Wykstra, “CORNEA, Carnap,” p. 88. McBrayer’s quotation omits the parts we have 
here put in brackets, which will become important below.
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McBrayer, picking up on this suggestion, urges that CORNEA should 
itself be seen as “a restriction on when any ‘cognized situation’ counts 
as evidence” for a hypothesis. He offers his own rendition of CORNEA, 
which we will call McCORNEA:32
(McCORNEA) A subject S’s cognitive situation C is evidence for P only 
if it is reasonable for S to believe that were P false then C 
would [likely] be discernibly different.33
And he supports this rendering of CORNEA by selectively quoting 
Wykstra: “Wykstra concedes as much: “the key idea behind CORNEA is 
a proposed test for whether some alleged evidence seriously ‘supports’ 
. . . some hypothesis H.”34
But McCORNEA has three problems. First, whereas Wykstra’s “key idea” 
refers to a constraint on evidence that seriously supports a hypothesis, Mc-
CORNEA makes this a constraint on evidence simpliciter.35 Second, whereas 
McBrayer intends to be offering a formulation of CORNEA, Wykstra is not. 
He is attempting to articulate the “key idea behind CORNEA.” And this key 
idea concerns a constraint on when some datum is levering evidence—to be 
distinguished from CORNEA’s constraint on when the datum can be rea-
sonably regarded as levering evidence. Third, whereas on McCORNEA, the 
constraint itself is internalist (that it be reasonable for a person to believe the 
crux subjunctive), on Wykstra’s suggestion, the constraint is an externalist 
one (that crux be true).
The key idea that McBrayer imperfectly appropriates, then, is this: that 
“behind” the internalist CORNEA is a deeper externalist principle, one 
that lends plausibility and support to CORNEA. And just as CORNEA 
is doubly internalist, so this deeper principle is doubly externalist. It is 
externalist, first, in what it is a constraint on—namely, on when something 
is evidence of the “seriously supporting” (i.e., levering) type. It is external-
ist, second, in what the constraint is—namely, that it be true that, if H were 
false, then E would likely be different.36 The deeper CORE principle, put 
side by side with CORNEA, is then as follows:
32We thank Trent Dougherty for the label.
33McBrayer, 81 (italics ours). McBrayer renders what follows “reasonable to believe” as a 
counterfactual in David Lewis’s notation. We have restored it to a grammatical subjunctive. 
McBrayer also omits the crucial “likely” that we have here put in brackets.
34McBrayer, 81, citing Wykstra’s “CORNEA, Carnap,” 88.
35Here by his ellipses, McBrayer is omitting Wykstra’s “—in a sense to be clarified pres-
ently—.” By this phrase Wykstra is alerting the reader that “seriously supports” will be 
explicated via his forthcoming definition of levering evidence.
36In addition to the well-known constraint on knowledge found in Nozick’s Philosophi-
cal Explanations (172ff.), there is also a little-discussed section (248ff.) in which Nozick 
also defends a sensitivity constraint on evidence. He proposes that in order for E to be 
evidence for a hypothesis H, it must be true that “if H weren’t true, then E wouldn’t 
hold.” Nozick’s constraint is distinct from CORE in at least the following way: it has 
a wider domain—over any evidence—whereas CORE is a constraint only on levering 
evidence.
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CORNEA CORE
For person P in cognitive situation S, P 
is entitled to claim that new evidence E 
is levering evidence for H only if it is 
reasonable for P to believe that (crux) if H 
were false, E would, in the situation, 
likely be different.
In cognitive situation S giving new input 
E, E is levering evidence for hypothesis 
H only if it is true that (crux) if H were 
false, E would likely be different.
1.4 understanding CORNEA’s Conditional
We’ve seen that both CORE and CORNEA have, at their heart, the condi-
tional proposition we’ve dubbed crux:
crux: if H were false, E would likely be different.
The crux proposition is a grammatical subjunctive, a conditional in the 
subjunctive mood. Due to this grammatical feature, McBrayer takes it as 
expressing a logical subjunctive, or “counterfactual conditional.” Conse-
quently he evaluates it using the possible-world semantics pioneered by 
Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis. But here caution is in order. As Stalnaker 
himself notes, grammatical subjunctives sometimes express, not logical 
subjunctives, but instead “non-counterfactual subjunctives.” His example 
of a non-counterfactual subjunctive is: 
If the butler had done it, we would have found just [i.e., exactly] the 
evidence we did find.37
Stalnaker envisions this sentence as uttered in a context where the speak-
er—perhaps a detective—is arguing that the evidence confirms that the 
butler did do it. In calling this subjunctive “non-counterfactual,” Stalnaker 
does not simply mean that its antecedent is not contrary-to-fact. He means 
more deeply that such grammatical subjunctives should not be evaluated 
using a Lewis-Stalnaker closest-possible-worlds semantic.38
We agree with Stalnaker that some grammatical subjunctives are not 
best understood as logical subjunctives. Further, his example strikingly 
illustrates the natural use of grammatical subjunctives to express the evi-
dential implications so vital to hypothesis testing. It is natural to say, for 
example: “If Huygen’s vortex theory of gravity were true, it is entirely 
expectable that the planets would revolve around the sun in the same 
direction; whereas if Newton’s theory were true, this phenomenon would 
be rather improbable.”
37Stalnaker, “Indicative Conditionals,” 146. The striking affinity of CORNEA with Stal-
naker’s example needs no comment. The same affinity is found with Alan Ross Anderson’s 
examples such as “If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those symp-
toms which he does in fact show.” See Anderson’s “A Note on Subjunctive and Counter- 
factual Conditionals,” 37.
38For Stalnaker’s argument, see “Indicative Conditionals.” A full discussion of Stalnaker’s 
treatment of conditionals is beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader should 
consult his “A Theory of Conditionals” and “Indicative Conditionals,” both in Jackson, Con-
ditionals.
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As we see it, the most promising way to think about these evidential 
implications is as conditional probabilities. The examples are then saying 
that the probability of finding just the evidence that was found, conditional 
on the hypothesis that the butler did do it (and our other background infor-
mation), is high, and that the conditional probability of the planets revolv-
ing around the sun in the same direction is high on Huygens’s theory, but 
not on Newton’s theory. We thus suggest that, in the hypothesis-testing 
context, grammatical subjunctives are often best understood as expressing 
evidential implications of hypotheses, and that such implications are best 
understood as conditional probabilities.
To be sure, understanding grammatical subjunctives in this way also 
raises some vexing issues about whether the formalism of the probability 
calculus—and the formal notion of conditional probability that is defined 
within it—has any meaningful general application to the arena of hypothe-
sis testing. Some thinkers—Richard Von Mises, for example—argue that it 
is wrong-headed to think that the probability calculus has any relevance 
to evaluating historical evidence for hypotheses about unique events or 
processes (say, the hypothesis that Kennedy was killed by Lee Harvey 
Oswald, or that Jesus of Nazareth rose from the dead). The probability 
calculus and formal notion of conditional probability, as von Mises sees 
it, has relatively narrow application—it applies only, he thinks, to “mass 
phenomena” involving events of an indefinitely repeatable type, allowing 
us to assign long-term ratios of favorable outcomes within an indefinitely 
large class.
Others, like Rudolf Carnap, think that the probability calculus and 
notion of conditional probability have broader application. On Carnap’s 
view, for example, the probability relation can be modeled by logical re-
lations of “partial entailment” between propositions, even where these 
involve no mass phenomena or discrete repeatable events to which fre-
quency-ratios can be assigned. Such partial-entailment relations, Carnap 
thinks, bear intimately on the rational credibility of hypotheses. Work-
ing within this Carnapian tradition, Richard Swinburne thinks that 
even if there is only one unique universe, we can meaningfully speak 
of the conditional probability of (say) the phenomenon of beauty on the 
hypothesis that God created that universe, and compare this with condi-
tional probability of beauty on a naturalistic hypothesis. And even if we 
can only attach comparative estimates to these conditional probabilities, 
Swinburne thinks we can properly and usefully employ the probability 
calculus to help us discern, in a comparative though admittedly non-
quantitative way, how the probability—interpreted as “rational cred-
ibility”—of each hypothesis changes as a widening range of evidence is 
taken into account.39
39See, for instance, Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 14–19; and his “Introduction” to Bayes’s Theorem, ed. Richard Swinburne (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 1–20.
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While our sympathies lie with these broader applications, we concede 
to von Mises that in these broader applications, it is often not easy to say 
what relationship between propositions is being mapped onto the con-
ditional probability relation. Happily, however, McBrayer’s chief coun-
terexample to CORNEA involves a lottery scenario—just the sort of case 
involving those limit frequencies that, as von Mises helps us see, affords 
the best traction for the conditional probability relation within the prob-
ability calculus.
Taking crux in this way, we’ll understand “If H were false, E would 
likely be different” as saying that the conditional probability of E, given 
the falsity of H, is low—at least below .5. Put in standard notation, this 
says that P (E  |   ~H) < .5. So instead of approaching crux by using a possible 
world semantics, we use the probability calculus as our tool of choice, 
making use of Bayes’s theorem and weighted averages. Taken simply as 
a theorem in the probability calculus, Bayes’s theorem is usually put as:
P (A | B) = P (A)  * 
P (B | A) 
P (B ) 
But as Swinburne and Wesley Salmon have taught us,40 this formula can be 
applied to the relationship between a hypothesis H and alleged confirming 
evidence E. On this application, we take the “absolute” probabilities P (A) 
and P (B) as P (H  |  k) and P (E | k)—that is, as the background probabilities 
of H and E on some relevant background information k. Bayes’s theorem 
then tells us that P (H | E & k)—the new probability of H when E is added 
to k—is as follows:
P (H | E & k) = P (H | k)  * 
P (E | H & k) 
P (E | k ) 
As we’ll see, Bayes’s theorem will be a powerful tool for applying COR-
NEA and CORE to McBrayer’s chief counterexample scenario.
2. mcBrayer’s lOTTO Argument
Having clarified CORNEA and CORE, we now consider how each prin-
ciple fares against McBrayer’s counterexample. His paper puts the most 
weight on his first “lottery” counterexample, so we shall do so as well. We 
shall, following McBrayer’s lead, finesse his initial scenario so as to make 
his counterexample applicable to the more mature and sober versions of 
CORNEA (and CORE).
McBrayer initially formulates his lottery argument as follows:
40For Swinburne, see the aforementioned works. For Salmon see, inter alia, his “Bayes’ 
Theorem and the History of Science,” in minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 5 
historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science, ed. Roger H. Stuewer (Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 1970), 68–86, and “Rationality and Objectivity in Science, or 
Tom Kuhn Meets Tom Bayes,” in minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 14, ed. C. 
Wade Savage (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 175–204.
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Though I hold a ticket, I believe that I will lose the lottery. I have inductive 
evidence for this claim. I know that the odds of winning are one in a mil-
lion. Is my evidence sensitive to the fact that I will lose the lottery? Go to 
the closest world in which I win. I just get lucky and pull the right ticket. 
Is it reasonable to believe that my cognitive situation in the actual world 
would be discernibly different from my cognitive situation in the possible 
world in which I win? No—things would look just the same to me. So, my 
cognized situation in this case is not evidence for the claim that I will lose 
the lottery.
Let’s here refer to the ticket-holder as “Holt,” so as to keep his beliefs dis-
tinct from McBrayer’s claims about him. McBrayer portrays Holt as both 
knowing that
(1) The odds of (Holt) winning are one in a million.
and as taking (1) to be “inductive evidence for”
(2) Holt will lose the lottery.
Our intuition, McBrayer thinks, is that in this scenario, (1) is inductive 
evidence for (2). But is CORNEA consistent with this intuition? It is con-
sistent, on McBrayer’s line of thought,41 only if it is reasonable for Holt to 
believe the crucial conditional:
crux: “If Holt were to win the lottery, then Holt’s evidence—(1)—would 
[likely] be discernibly different.”42
McBrayer thinks that crux is neither true nor reasonable for him [or Holt] 
to believe. For in the closest world where Holt wins the lottery—the world 
where, by luck, he has simply drawn the winning ticket—(1) isn’t any dif-
ferent. Things “would look just the same.” And that things would look the 
same is, McBrayer says, something that “I [and Holt] know full well.” Thus, 
it is not reasonable for him [or Holt] to believe crux. In this way, neither 
CORNEA nor CORE seems consistent with our best epistemic intuitions.
2.1 First Improvements
McBrayer, alerted by an anonymous referee, goes on to improve this sce-
nario in several important ways. He notes—in accord with our own ex-
egesis above—that in its later and more mature formulations, CORNEA is 
formulated as a constraint not on “evidence simpliciter” but on a specific 
sort of evidence, namely, “dynamic” evidence of “levering” strength.43 But 
41McBrayer’s counterexample, while directed against the misbegotten McCORNEA, 
can without loss (or gain) be redirected against CORNEA (and CORE), and in expressing 
McBrayer’s “line of thought,” we do just this. 
42McBrayer, 83.
43McBrayer suggests that CORNEA was originally meant to be a constraint on “evidence 
simpliciter,” and that only later was it restricted to dynamic levering evidence. But the dis-
tinction between static and dynamic evidence, and between weak and strong dynamic 
evidence, was central to the original exposition of Rowe’s case. And while Wykstra claims 
in “The Humean Obstacle” that Rowe’s evidence isn’t “even weak evidence” for atheism, he 
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in his scenario as currently specified, proposition (1) does not clearly func-
tion as levering evidence. For the scenario does not describe Holt as being 
in some initial doxastic state, and then shifting to some new doxastic state; 
nor does it describe the shift so as to make clear that it is a proper shift 
from square non-belief to square belief; nor does it specify some specific 
cognitive input that effects this shift. The counterexample thus, he notes, 
might be dismissed as attacking only a straw man.
But McBrayer argues that his scenario is easily improved so as to make 
Holt’s evidence a clear case of levering evidence—while still clearly failing 
CORNEA’s test. Here is his finesse of the scenario to that end:
Holt is given a lottery ticket in ignorance of how many tickets are sold. Per-
haps Holt has the only ticket, or perhaps there are a million tickets. Being 
rational, Holt withholds belief concerning the proposition that he will win 
the lottery. Later Holt learns that the odds of winning are one in a million. 
Based on this new information, Holt disbelieves that he will win the lottery. 
Holt’s cognitive situation in this case warrants a revision from non-belief to 
disbelief. The evidence is therefore levering evidence.44
2.2 Second Improvements
The added details in McBrayer’s finesse go some distance toward giving a 
situation in which there is a shift from square non-belief to square belief 
(or square disbelief),45 and thus a case of levering evidence. But they do 
not, we think, give enough detail to specify a specific cognitive input that is 
affecting this shift.46 As stated, the scenario still specifies the basis of the 
shift as Holt’s “knowing that”
(1) The odds of (Holt) winning are one in a million.
But this is entirely too vague. It gives no concrete depiction of what Holt’s 
specific new “cognitive input situation” is supposed to be.47 The belief (or 
“knowledge”) that (1), after all, normally rests on a very complex bramble 
of considerations put in place over a long period of time. One of these is 
the information Holt has as to the size of the lottery; but in grounding 
(1), this works in tandem with many other considerations that are nor-
mally part of one’s background beliefs—e.g., that the lottery tickets are 
distributed by a humanly fair non-rigged process, that no angels or other 
later qualifies this as over-reaching, and it is not clear that the over-reaching version is built 
into his earliest formulation of CORNEA. 
44McBrayer, 85. We here reformulate in third person.
45Square disbelief that he has a winning ticket is of course the same as square belief that 
he has a losing ticket.
46CORNEA was from the start expressly formulated as a constraint on how belief should 
be dynamically altered by the addition of specific new cognitive input. Here see Wykstra’s use 
of the example of Tom and his worm-sandwich in “The Humean Obstacle,” 80.
47And this leaves us equally at sea about what it would take, concretely, for Holt’s situa-
tion to be “discernibly different.”
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supernatural beings are giving one special dibs on winning lotteries of 
this sort, and so forth.
We will improve the scenario by specifying that one of these consider-
ations is a new cognitive input situation, so that it is intuitively clear that 
this input will, when added to other normal background considerations 
already in place, significantly raise the probability or degree of confidence 
of (1). The simplest way to do this is to suppose that what Holt receives, 
as new input, is reliable information about the size of the lottery. Our im-
provements thus extend McBrayer’s finesse by adding to the improved 
scenario that Holt gets specific new input from a reliable source that (1') 
the lottery is a million ticket lottery, and that prior to learning this, Holt has 
in place other normal background beliefs—of the sort just mentioned—so 
that this new input does greatly increase his degree of confidence in (2).
2.3 Third Improvements
Despite the important finesses made so far, the improved LOTTO sce-
nario is still flawed. The scenario is meant to be one in which Holt’s cogni-
tive situation clearly effects and warrants a shift from square non-belief to 
square belief. But does such a shift occur in the scenario as described so 
far? Notice, in particular, Holt’s initial doxastic state:
Holt is given a lottery ticket in ignorance of how many tickets are sold. Per-
haps Holt has the only ticket, or perhaps there are a million tickets. Being 
rational, Holt withholds [i.e., suspends] belief concerning the proposition 
that he will win the lottery.48
Here we can read the word “perhaps” in two very different ways. On 
the most natural reading, the two possibilities mentioned are illustrative. 
Holt knows he holds a lottery ticket, but he has no idea how large the lot-
tery is: perhaps it is from one-ticket lottery, or perhaps from a two ticket 
lottery, or perhaps a three-ticket one . . . up to (let’s say) a one-million 
ticket lottery.49 But read in this way, the story does not give a scenario in 
which Holt is in an initial state of square non-belief, that is, of squarely 
suspended belief. Such a state is, we saw, a confidence level associated 
48McBrayer, 85.
49On this reading, the scenario puts Holt in a situation of modest ignorance: while igno-
rant about the actual size of the lottery, he has some idea of the distribution of probabili-
ties within the range of possible sizes. This is tantamount to Holt’s having a ticket that he 
knows has been randomly chosen from a “distribution” of a million distinct lotteries, one of 
which is a one-ticket lottery, the next a two-ticket lottery, etc., up to a million-ticket lottery. 
But if Holt’s situation is one of radical ignorance, where he has no idea of the distribution 
in a possible range, it might plausibly be claimed (as Harry Plantinga and Glen Ross have 
noted) that Holt cannot meaningfully associate any probability—neither high, middle, or 
low—to having in hand a winning ticket: he must see it as being indeterminately probable, 
or “aprobable.” In this event the probability calculus seems to no longer apply, although we 
think it plausible some analogue of the CORNEA constraint should still apply to evidence 
that levers him out of that “aprobable” state into one of square belief or disbelief. We here 
confine ourselves to the more tractable “modest ignorance” construal of the scenario, hop-
ing to return to this more difficult case at a later date. We thank Mike Bergmann for press-
ing us on this point.
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with a probability of around .5. But on the present reading, Holt’s situ-
ation is tantamount to one in which it is equally probable that his ticket 
is from a one-ticket lottery, or that it is from a two-ticket lottery, . . . up 
to a million ticket lottery. A little calculation shows that in this situation, 
the probability of holding a winning ticket is nowhere near .5: instead it 
is something like 1 in 70,000, making the probability of holding a losing 
ticket something like 69,999 in 70,000, or .999986.50 Holt’s initial situation 
thus does not warrant a state of square non-belief at all; what is initially 
warranted is instead a confidence level associated with a .999986 probabil-
ity. And his new evidence, instead of levering him from a doxastic state of 
around .5 to something well over .99, nudges him from a .999986 doxastic 
“square belief” state to a .999999 doxastic “square belief” state.
To remedy this problem, we shall re-structure the scenario so that 
Holt’s initial situation is one in which the two possibilities mentioned by 
McBrayer (i.e., “perhaps I have the only ticket, or perhaps there are a mil-
lion others”) are not illustrative, but instead exhaustive. Holt, let us sup-
pose, knows that his ticket is from one of two lotteries—either from a mil-
lion-ticket lottery, or from a single ticket lottery. The scenario does now 
put Holt in an initial state of squarely suspended belief about whether he 
has a losing or winning ticket. And consequently, his new evidence—that 
his ticket is from a million ticket lottery—does now dynamically shift Holt 
from square non-belief to square belief that the ticket he holds is a losing 
ticket.51 Here, then, is our triply-improved version of McBrayer’s LOTTO 
scenario, with some details added for ease of reference:
Holt has purchased two tickets, one for a one-ticket raffle at a Dutch church 
picnic (with a used Psalter hymnal prize), and the other from a million-
ticket Catholic raffle. He stores them in his room. He then finds one ticket 
missing—his thieving brother Klep slipped into the room and stole one of 
them. Holt knows this much, but he doesn’t know which ticket Klep stole. 
In this initial evidential situation, the odds that he holds the Dutch ticket 
are thus 50/50. Holt’s initial state is one of squarely suspended-belief about 
whether he holds the losing (or winning) ticket.
50It’s easiest to see this if we imagine Holt knowing there are one million possible lotter-
ies, ranging incrementally from a one-ticket lottery to a one-million (or two-million, etc.) 
ticket lottery. The probability that the ticket he holds is a winning ticket would simply be 
a summation, for each of these lotteries, of the probability that a ticket is a winning ticket 
given that it is from that lottery, multiplied by the probability that it is from that lottery. 
Thus, for the first 1-ticket lottery, we have a probability of 1 (there is a probability of 1 that 
he has the winning ticket given that it is from that lottery) times one-millionth or 10-6 (the 
probability that it is from that lottery). The weighted summation is (1/1 * 10-6) + (1/2 * 10-6) + 
(1/3 * 10-6) … + (1/10-6) * 10-6). This is equal to [1/1 + 1/2 + 1/3 + … 1/10-6] * 10-6. The series in 
brackets, [1/1 + 1/2 + 1/3 + … 1/10-6], is equal to about 14.39. The weighted summation is thus 
14.39/106, or roughly 14 in a million, which is roughly 1 in 70,000—pretty long odds. We 
thank Harry Plantinga in Calvin’s Computer Science Department for grinding out the 14.39 
using a quickly written and executed Pascal algorithm.
51It’s worth noting that it effects this shift by a two-staged process: first it shifts his belief 
about the odds of any given ticket-holder’s winning the lottery; this in turn shifts him to a 
new degree of belief that his own ticket is a loser.
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But Holt now gets new input: Klep, in his usual compulsively honest way, 
breaks down and confesses that the ticket he stole is the Dutch ticket. Get-
ting this new information properly levers Holt from square non-belief into 
square belief that the ticket he holds is a losing (because Catholic) ticket. 
Klep’s testimony thus qualifies as levering evidence.
We think this triply-improved scenario puts McBrayer’s scenario in its 
most formidable form. Now Holt’s new cognitive input does seem to func-
tion as levering evidence: it shifts Holt—properly, it seems—from squarely 
suspended belief to square belief that he holds a losing ticket. At the same 
time, this evidence does not seem to satisfy the constraints that CORNEA 
and CORE—using crux—put on levering evidence. And it does not seem 
to for the very reasons that McBrayer—adopting a counterfactual reading 
of crux—gives: in the closest possible world where Holt—by luck—has a 
winning ticket, his new inductive evidence (Klep’s testimony to stealing 
the Dutch ticket, telling him his ticket is a one-in-a-million long shot) is 
exactly the same. Hence, if Holt were to have the winning ticket, his evi-
dence would not be different—instead, it would be the same. So it seems 
that Holt’s evidence fails both the CORNEA and CORE tests.
With the triply-improved scenario in mind, we thus put McBrayer’s ar-
gument as follows:
(Lotto-1) If CORE [CORNEA] is right, then in the improved lottery sce-
nario, Holt does not have [and is not entitled to claim that he 
has] levering evidence that his ticket is a losing ticket.52
(Lotto-2) But in the improved lottery scenario, Holt has [and is entitled 
to claim he has] levering evidence that his ticket is a losing 
ticking.
(Lotto-3) So CORE [CORNEA] is false.
3. CORE as Conditional Probability: What Bayes’s Theorem Requires
According to CORE, E is levering evidence for H only if crux—if H were 
false, then E would likely be different—is true. In his LOTTO counter-
example, McBrayer interprets crux as a logical subjunctive, using Lewis-
Stalnaker semantics to evaluate it. But as noted above, crux can also be in-
terpreted as a conditional probability. Putting these two interpretations53 
of CORE side by side:
52It is of course possible that Holt’s evidence fails to be levering evidence because it fails 
some other necessary constraint on levering evidence. So we here mean Lotto-1 to be ellipti-
cal for something like “if CORE and CORNEA are true, then Holt’s evidence isn’t levering 
evidence because it fails their tests.” 
53It’s a bit imprecise to call P-CORE an “interpretation” of CORE. C-CORE does use stan-
dard semantics so as to “interpret” CORE, but P-CORE merely invokes the notion of con-
ditional probability, without offering any interpretation (logical, frequentist, propensity, 
etc) of the term “probable.” We pursue related issues in our forthcoming essay in Skeptical 
Theism: New Essays, ed. Trent Dougherty and Justin McBrayer (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press).
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(CORE)
In cognitive situation S giving new input E, E is levering evidence for H only if 
it is the case that: (crux) if H were false, then E would likely be different.
(C-CORE) In cognitive situation S 
giving new input E, E is levering evi-
dence for H only if it is the case that: 
(c-crux) in the closest possible world(s) 
in which not-H is true, E is [likely] not 
true.
(P-CORE) In cognitive situation S giv-
ing new input E, E is levering evidence 
for H only if it is the case that: (p-crux) the 
conditional probability of E on not-H 
—viz, P (E | not-H & k)—is below .5.
Now McBrayer cases threaten C-CORE (and CORNEA) because in 
them, E seems to be levering evidence even though the c-crux require-
ment evidently fails to be satisfied. We will argue here that interpreting 
CORE as P-CORE deflects this threat, and puts us in a position to see 
why, in cases like these, counterfactual conditionals behave differently 
than conditional probabilities. In Section 3, we show that Bayes’s theo-
rem itself entails—in perfect accord with P-CORE—that p-crux must be 
satisfied if E is to be levering evidence for H. In Section 4, we then use an 
expanded form of Bayes’s theorem to show that—and, more importantly, 
why—p-crux is indeed true in McBrayer’s LOTTO scenario, so that P-CORE 
is satisfied in this scenario. (We also show that on this treatment, p-crux 
is reasonable to believe in this scenario, so that the probabilistic version of 
CORNEA—P-CORNEA, as it were—is also satisfied.)
Since our focus in Sections 3 and 4 will be entirely on the probabilistic 
versions of CORE, and crux, these sections will use the terms ‘CORNEA’ 
and ‘CORE’ and ‘crux’ to refer to their probabilistic P-versions.
3.1 dictionary of Abbreviations
When we take crux as a conditional probability, CORE says that E is lever-
ing evidence for H only if, in the situation, we wouldn’t likely get evidence 
E on not-H—that is, only if the conditional probability of E on not-H is 
below .5. Here, then, is the probabilistic rendering of CORE:
(P-CORE) In cognitive situation S giving new input E, E is levering evi-
dence for H only if it is the case that: the conditional prob-
ability of E on not-H—viz, P (E | not-H & k)—is below .5.
To see how P-CORE handles McBrayer cases—and begin to see why it 
works differently from C-CORE—we view the question through the lens 
of a standard application of Bayes’s theorem:
P (H | E & k)       =      P (H | k)      * 
P (E | H & k) 
P (E | k ) 
NEW PROB OF H   =   OLD PROB OF H    *    “THE QuOTIENT”
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On this application, Bayes’s theorem tells us that the “new probability” 
of a hypothesis—namely, P (H | E & k)—is equal to the “old probability” of H 
on k alone—namely, P (H | k)—times a special fraction that John Maynard 
Keynes called “the relevance quotient,” and that we shall just call “The 
Quotient.” In it, the numerator P (E | H & k) represents how probable, or “ex-
pectable,” the evidence E is, on the assumption that hypothesis H (together 
with our background information k) is true. The denominator P (E | k) rep-
resents how likely the evidence E is, merely on the assumption of our back-
ground knowledge k by itself. We shall refer to these as, respectively, the 
“hypothetical expectability” of the new evidence E (its likelihood assuming 
the hypothesis is true) and the “background expectability” of E (its likeli-
hood on the mere assumption of the background information alone).
In applying Bayes’s theorem to the LOTTO scenario, we will use the 
following abbreviations:
k = Holt’s background information. This includes (but is not exhausted 
by) the following salient points: that he bought two tickets for lotteries or 
raffles as described above, that his brother Klep stole one of these tickets, 
leaving the other in his possession; that Klep, while a kleptomaniac, is 
compulsively honest in truthfully confessing his misdeeds, and so on.
E = Holt’s new evidence (Klep’s confession that the ticket he stole is the 
Dutch ticket).
HL = the hypothesis that the ticket Holt holds is a losing ticket.
Hw = the hypothesis that the ticket Holt holds is a winning ticket.
In the next section, we shall also have occasion to use two further abbre-
viations:
Hwd = the hypothesis that the ticket Holt holds is a winning ticket from 
the Dutch raffle.
Hwc = the hypothesis that the ticket Holt holds is a winning ticket from 
the Catholic lottery.
CORE says that Holt’s new evidence E counts as levering evidence for HL 
only if: were not-HL true, then E would likely be different. This constraint, 
interpreted as a conditional probability, requires that P (E | ~HL & k) be low. 
Now ~HL is, in the scenario, the same as Hw. So the constraint just requires 
that P (E | Hw & k) be low.
By working backwards from the fact that E is levering evidence for HL 
in the LOTTO scenario (a point on which we and McBrayer agree), we 
now aim to see what requirement Bayes’s theorem puts on this levering 
evidence, so as to compare it with the CORE requirement.
3.2 The Bayesian Requirement: Step One
We begin, then, by agreeing with McBrayer that in Holt’s situation, E most 
definitely is levering evidence for HL. In the improved scenario, Holt is 
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reasonably shifted by his new evidence from square agnosticism to square 
belief. Holt begins in a state of squarely suspended belief, assigning to 
P (HL | k) a probability of .5; his new evidence—being levering evidence—
then properly boosts this to a probability of .99 or better.54
Plugging these into Bayes’s theorem, we get
.99 = .5  * 
P (E | HL & k) 
P (E | k ) 
Working backwards, it is evident by inspection that in this scenario, E’s 
being levering evidence for HL requires The Quotient itself to be nearly 2.
3.3 The Bayesian Requirement: Step Two
But what, in turn, does this require?
We can make one more step by noting that in the Lotto scenario, the 
numerator of The Quotient—namely, P (E | HL & k)—is close to 1. HL is, af-
ter all, the hypothesis that Holt holds a losing ticket, and our background 
information k includes the claim that the Dutch ticket is a sure winner. 
It follows that if Holt has a losing ticket, he must have a Catholic ticket. 
And Holt’s having a Catholic ticket entails that Klep must have stolen the 
dutch ticket. But given (from our background information) Klep’s com-
pulsive honesty, Klep stealing the Dutch ticket implies that his confession 
will be to stealing the Dutch ticket—which is just E. So, P (E | HL & k) is 1.
55 
But this means the Bayesian Formula now becomes
.99 = .5  * 
1 
P (E | k ) 
Working backwards one more step, it is evident by inspection that in 
this scenario, E’s being levering evidence for H requires that The Quo-
tient’s denominator—namely, P (E | k)—must be about .5.
3.4 The Bayesian Requirement: Voila!
But what, in turn, does this require?
To answer this, we must look closely at what the denominator P (E | k) 
signifies. Earlier we referred to the denominator as the “background ex-
pectability” of E on the assumption of our background information—
k—alone. We contrast the denominator with the numerator, which is the 
“hypothetical expectability” of E on the assumption that the hypothesis 
of interest—here HL—is true. However, this contrast must not mislead us 
54Again, we remind the reader that the values we assign here are not exact, nor need 
they be for present purposes.
55Note that it is not a requirement of positive levering evidence (shifting one from square 
agnosticism to square belief) that the numerator of the Quotient have a value close to 1. 
What is required is the value of the Quotient be around 2; in some cases this may be because 
the numerator has a value of, say, .04, and the denominator a value of .02.
FOuNdATIONS OF SKEPTICAl ThEISm 395
into thinking that P (E | k) is the probability of E on the hypothesis that 
HL is false. Rather, the value of P (E | k) is an average of E’s hypothetical 
expectability on both HL and Hw, where those values are each corrected by 
a “weighting factor” of how likely, on their own, HL and Hw are. That is, 
the value of P (E | k) in an expanded form is:
P (E | k) = P (E | HL & k) * P (HL | k) + P (E | Hw & k) * P (Hw | k)
In this expanded form, there are five terms, and four of them have val-
ues determined by the scenario. We saw in our last step that in order for E 
to be levering evidence, P (E | k) must be about .5. We also know from that 
step, that P (E | HL & K)—the hypothetical expectability of E on HL—is 1. We 
know, from our first step, that P (HL | k) is .5. And we know that P (Hw | k) is 
also .5, since Hw is the denial of HL. Plugging these four values in gives us:
.5 ≅ [1 * .5] + [ P (E | Hw & k)) * .5 ]
Working backwards one more step, it is evident by visual inspection 
and a little arithmetic that for E to be levering evidence, the hypothetical 
expectability of E on Hw (here put in boldface) must be very low—close to 
zero, comparatively speaking. That is:
[ P (E | Hw & k) ≅ 0 ]
In other words, an application of Bayes’s theorem shows that E’s being 
levering evidence for HL requires that the conditional probability of E on 
Hw (along with our background knowledge) be very low—well below .5. 
But this more than satisfies what the CORE constraint requires! For the 
CORE constraint says that E is levering evidence for H only if, were H 
false, it is unlikely that one would get input E—in other words, that the 
conditional probability of E on not-H is below .5.
This result should renew our confidence that CORE is fundamentally 
right-headed. For using only Bayes’s theorem, with no appeal at all to 
CORE, we have shown that in this McBrayer scenario, Bayes’s theorem 
entails the constraint on levering evidence that is imposed by CORE. Thus 
a Bayesian approach also dictates that unless this CORE constraint is sat-
isfied, E cannot be levering evidence for HL.
4. But Is It Satisfied? Bright Light from an Obscure Corner
But is the above constraint—that the conditional probability of E on Hw be 
below .5—in point of fact satisfied in the scenario? So far we have shown only 
that if E is to be levering evidence in the scenario, then this constraint must 
be satisfied. But is it? Can we show this simply by focusing on the details 
of the scenario? We are now in a position to address this crucial question.
4.1 Is CORE Satisfied?
To evaluate whether the conditional probability P (E | Hw & k) is indeed 
low, it is crucial to notice that there are two ways in which Holt can 
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possess the winning ticket—namely, by possessing a winning Catholic 
ticket, or by possessing the winning Dutch ticket. For this reason, deter-
mining P (E | Hw & k), the expectability of getting Klep’s testimony condi-
tional on Holt’s holding a winning ticket, requires that we consider both 
the Catholic and Dutch ways of Holt’s holding a winning ticket. The ex-
pectability of getting E (Klep’s testimony) given Hw (that Holt holds a win-
ning ticket) will be a weighted average. It will be the weighted sum of E’s 
hypothetical expectabilities on each of the ways of Holt’s holding a win-
ning ticket, with each multiplied by a corresponding “weighting factor” of 
how likely that way of holding a winning ticket is. That is:
P (E | Hw & k) = [P (E | Hwd & k) * P (Hwd | k)]   +   [P (E | Hwc & k) * P (Hwc | k)]
                                                                            = [                                    Addend #1                                   ]          +        [                                   Addend #2                                 ]
Clearly, for P (E | Hw & k) to be very low, each addend must be very low. 
And in the actual scenario, as we shall now see, both addends are in fact 
very low—though for very different reasons.
In the second addend, the first factor is P (E | Hwc & k). This is the con-
ditional probability of evidence E—Klep’s testimony to having stolen the 
Dutch ticket—on the hypothesis of Holt’s having a winning Catholic tick-
et. This value is very high: 1, or nearly 1. But it is weighted by the second 
factor, P (Hwc | k). This is the background probability (on k alone) of Holt’s 
having a winning Catholic ticket. And this value is very low. The back-
ground probability that Holt has the winning Catholic ticket is, after all, 
equal to the probability on k of having a Catholic ticket (namely, .5) multi-
plied by the probability on k of that ticket winning (namely, .000001). This 
value is .0000005—that is, one in two million. And since the first factor of 
Addend #2 is equal to 1, the value of Addend #2 is itself one over two mil-
lion—which is very low indeed.
Addend #1 is also very low, though for opposite reasons. Its weight-
ing factor is P (Hwd | k). This is the probability of Holt’s having a winning 
Dutch ticket on k alone. The probability of having a Dutch ticket on k is 
.5, and since there is only one Dutch ticket, the probability of having a 
winning Dutch ticket on k is also .5. So the weighting factor here is .5. 
But what that factor weights is P (E | Hwd & k)—the conditional probabil-
ity of E, on the hypothesis that Holt holds a winning Dutch ticket. And 
this probability is extremely low. For the hypothesis that Holt holds the 
winning Dutch ticket entails that Klep holds a Catholic ticket. And so on 
this hypothesis—given our background knowledge of Klep’s compulsive 
honesty—the conditional probability of Klep’s confessing to holding the 
dutch ticket is extremely low. Addend #1, which multiplies this by the 
weighting factor of .5, is thus also extremely low.
The sum of Addend 1 and Addend 2 is thus very low. And since that 
sum is equal to P (E | Hw & k), this means that the conditional probability 
of Klep’s testimony, on the hypothesis that Holt holds a winning ticket, is 
very low. And this more than satisfies what CORE requires. So the data of 
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Klep’s testimony passes CORE’s acid test for levering evidence. This means 
that McBrayer’s LOTTO argument fails at its first premise:56
(Lotto-1) If CORE is right, then in the improved Lotto Story, Holt does 
not have levering evidence that his ticket is a losing ticket.
Here Lotto-1 (as applied to CORE) rests on the claim that the data of Klep’s 
testimony does not satisfy the CORE constraint. On the conditional prob-
ability interpretation, this is false, and McBrayer’s Lotto Argument is un-
successful.
4.2 And Is CORNEA Satisfied Too?
We’ve argued that on the conditional probability construal, crux is true: the 
data of Klep’s testimony thus meets the CORE constraint, and CORE does 
not fall to the improved LOTTO counterexample. But what about CORNEA? 
For the internalist CORNEA to stand, what matters is not whether crux is 
true, but whether crux is something reasonable for holt to believe.
Let’s imagine Holt anxiously wondering whether he should regard 
Klep’s new testimony as levering evidence, and thus be levered into regret-
fully but squarely believing that his ticket is a loser. Suppose Holt engages 
in the following soliloquy:
Hmm. Klep confessed to stealing the Dutch ticket? Well, what should I ex-
pect, regarding Klep’s testimony, if I were to have a winning ticket? Should 
I in that event expect Klep’s testimony to be different than it is—i.e., should 
I expect that he would have confessed to stealing the Catholic ticket? Or 
should I, in that event, expect Klep’s testimony to be the same—to confess 
that the ticket he stole is the Dutch ticket?
This is a bit tricky to figure out retrospectively, because as it happens, 
I already know what my brother did testify. So let’s imagine I don’t know 
this—that his confession is in a sealed envelope, that I rightly expect it to be 
as compulsively honest as usual, but that I haven’t opened the envelope yet. 
And now suppose that my wife has just called me and told me that I’ve won 
one of the lotteries, but the reception is bad and I didn’t hear which one. So 
having gotten the information that I have a winning ticket, how expectable 
is it, given that information, that Klep’s letter in the sealed envelope says 
that the ticket he stole is the dutch ticket?
Intuitively, it is compellingly clear that it isn’t likely at all: on the supposi-
tion that I’ve got a winning ticket, the odds are vastly in favor of his having 
stolen—and so of confessing in his letter to have stolen—the Catholic ticket 
(leaving me with the Dutch ticket).
But why is this? Well, there’s no doubt some complex way to calculate 
this using probability theory, using the total probability theorem, weighted 
averages, and the like. But I will leave that to others; I haven’t studied that 
stuff since college. I’d just put it this way. Prior to opening Klep’s letter, on 
my background information, it is 50/50 whether I hold the Dutch ticket or 
the Catholic ticket. But on new information that I have a winning ticket, 
56As earlier, we take the truth of Lotto-1 to depend on the claim that Holt’s evidence fails 
the CORE test.
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this changes: my holding the Dutch ticket becomes vastly more probable 
than my holding the Catholic ticket; and—consequently—it becomes vastly 
more probable that the ticket stolen by Klep, and confessed to in his letter, is 
the Catholic ticket, not the Dutch ticket. As things actually stand, of course, 
he has confessed to having stolen the Dutch ticket; but if I were to have a 
winning ticket, it would be extremely likely that things would stand dif-
ferently—that his confession would be to having stolen the Catholic ticket.
This line of thinking is reasonable, and it is one that Holt—a compe-
tent rational adult—could utilize. It thus makes it reasonable for Holt to 
believe that if he had a winning ticket, his evidence would likely be dif-
ferent. The CORNEA constraint is thus met. And Lotto-1 (as applied to 
CORNEA) is false:
(Lotto-1) If CORNEA is right, then in the improved Lotto Story, Holt 
is not entitled to claim that his ticket is a losing ticket on the 
basis of Klep’s testimony.
So, McBrayer’s LOTTO scenario fails as a counterexample to CORNEA.
5. Two Evaluational Contexts
We’ve argued that McBrayer’s counterexample does not tell against the 
probabilistic renderings of CORNEA and CORE. Why then does it seem so 
plausible against the counterfactual renderings of CORNEA and CORE?
We think that the counterfactual treatment creates a strong pressure 
to conflate two distinct contexts, which we’ll call the pre- and post- 
evaluational contexts. Put simply, the pre-evaluational context is where 
data is yet to be evaluated; the post-evaluational context is where it has 
been evaluated. In the LOTTO scenario, Holt begins in a pre-evaluational 
context, where it is equally probable that he holds the Dutch or Catholic 
ticket. He then receives, as new data, the alleged evidence of Klep’s 
testimony. Because Holt immediately discerns its evidential bearing, he 
immediately moves to the post-evaluational context, in which he has been 
(properly) levered to square belief that he holds a Catholic (and hence al-
most certainly losing) ticket. Now CORE is a norm addressing the question 
of whether some data alleged to be levering evidence actually is. In apply-
ing CORE (and CORNEA), it is thus crucial to answer the test question 
regarding the truth or reasonableness of crux within the pre-evaluational 
context: to answer it in the post-evaluational context would be to beg the 
very question at issue.
McBrayer’s counterfactual construal makes this question-begging mis-
take a very natural one. In the LOTTO scenario, the test question takes the 
form “If it were false that Holt has a losing ticket (i.e., were he to have a win-
ning ticket), would his new data likely be different?” To evaluate this as a 
counterfactual, one must determine the closest antecedent world(s)—i.e., the 
world(s) in which Holt has a winning ticket that are most similar (on a relevant 
similarity-ordering) to the real word. McBrayer takes the closest antecedent 
world to be one where Holt happens to have a winning Catholic ticket. He 
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does so, presumably, because it is what Klep’s testimony so strongly and 
obviously indicates. This shift to the post-evaluational context, while beg-
ging the question, is abetted by the standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics. On 
that semantics, which antecedent world is “closest” is determined by how 
the real world actually is. When we are unsure or undecided about some 
relevant feature of the real world (like whether Holt has the Dutch or the 
Catholic ticket), using this semantics can thus create a strong pressure to pin 
down what the real world is like by making use of the new alleged evidence. 
The probabilistic treatment creates no such pressure. For when we ask the 
crucial question when the antecedent is epistemically “forked” (i.e., when 
we are undecided as between the Dutch way or the Catholic way of his hold-
ing a winning ticket), this treatment allows us to use weighted averages to 
take into account both prongs of the fork.
Where does this leave us on whether inductive evidence must be, in a 
Nozickean counterfactual sense, “sensitive” to the way the world is? Our 
results leave this as a vexing question. To the extent that Nozick’s sensi-
tivity requirement is tied to logical subjunctives, the answer will depend 
on whether the semantics for such subjunctives can be modified so as 
to incorporate the key strength of the conditional probability interpreta-
tion—namely, its use of Bayesian analysis and weighted averages—so as 
to handle “epistemic forks” between divergent ways in which the ante-
cedent of a subjunctive conditional can be true or false. Our results here 
open the possibility that sensitivity accounts could be rejuvenated by the 
injection of this Bayesian strength into the possible worlds account of sub-
junctive conditionals.57
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